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"WHO ARE YOU TO SAY WHAT MY BEST INTEREST
IS?" MINORS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WHEN
ADMITTED BY PARENTS FOR INPATIENT MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT
Kelli Schmidt
Abstract. In State ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hospital, the Washington Supreme Court
determined that minors who refuse to consent to inpatient mental health treatment, but are
admitted by their parents nonetheless, have a statutory right to a prompt judicial review of the
admission decision. This Comment argues that confining mature minors in mental hospitals
against their will is a deprivation of both liberty and privacy interests and, as such, stringent
due process protections are required, not only by Washington's current statutory scheme, but
also by the U.S. and Washington Constitutions. It concludes by stating that the current
statutory scheme meets the standards of both the substantive and procedural requirements of
constitutional due process but that any statutory amendments that lower these standards are
likely to fail to pass constitutional muster.
In State ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hospital,' the Washington
Supreme Court determined that a minor's2 due process rights were
violated when her parents and hospital staff failed to seek judicial
oversight of their decision to commit her to an inpatient mental health
facility without her consent? The court based its opinion on the specific
facts in the case and the intent and language of the 1995 "Becca Bill"
amendments4 to the Mental Health Care and Treatment for Minors Act.5
Because the case was resolved on statutory grounds, the court avoided
explicitly reaching the constitutional issue6 of the process due to minors
1. 129 Wash. 2d 439,918 P.2d 497 (1996).
2. For the purposes of this Comment, the terms "minor(s)," "juveniles," "youths," and "mature
minors" will be used to refer to youth between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, unless otherwise
indicated.
3. CPC Fairfax, 129 Wash. 2d at 451, 918 P.2d at 503. A second statutory violation occurred
when she was denied immediate access to counsel and subsequent access to her medical records. Id.
4. 1995 Wash. Laws 942, ch. 312, §§ 2, 52-54, 56, 58 (codified as amended at Wash. Rev. Code
chs. 71.34, 13.34 (1996)).
5. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 71.34.
6. CPC Fairfax, 129 Wash. 2d at 441, 918 P.2d at 498. The majority claims to avoid addressing
the constitutional issues posed by the case. However, the minority opinion accurately criticizes the
majority for nonetheless making strong statements that condemn the 'massive curtailment of liberty"
caused by the minor's admission to an inpatient Hospital as unconstitutional. Id. at 454, 918 P.2d at
505 (Dolliver, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing majority opinion at 453, 918 P.2d at 504).
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who refuse to consent to inpatient mental health treatment after they have
been presented to a facility for evaluation and treatment by their parents.7
This Comment examines minors' constitutional rights when facing
forced inpatient psychiatric treatment, under both the U.S.8 and
Washington State Constitutions. 9 It then argues that unconenting minors
not only have statutory rights to specific due process protections ° but
also fundamental constitutional rights to these processes under the Due
Process clauses of both constitutions. These rights inure because minors,
like adults, have significant liberty and privacy interests in refusing
forced inpatient mental health treatment. The need for stringent processes
to protect these interests is indeed stronger when parenis, rather than
state agents, admit their minor children to private, as opposed to public,
mental health facilities.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of minors' rights" in
regard to mental and medical health treatment.' 2 Part ]I argues that
minors, in common with adults, have constitutional rights to due process
protections when they refuse to provide consent for inpatient mental
health treatment. It examines the applicable sections of the Federal and
Washington State Constitutions 3 and the various interests implicated by
the state's current statutory scheme for the mental commitment of
minors. This Comment concludes that unconsenting minors have
significant liberty and privacy interests that are threaterned by forced
7. Prior to the Becca Bill amendments, a minor could be admitted by a parent only if the parent's
admission application included the "written consent, knowingly and voluntarily given, of the minor."
Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.030(2)(b) (1994) (amended 1995).
8. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
9. Wash. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 7.
10. Due process safeguards for forced institutionalization have traditionally included the
following rights: to be informed of the reasons for commitment, to judicial oversight of the
commitment decision, to be present at the commitment determination, to representation, to be heard,
to be confronted with adverse witnesses, to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of one's own. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); McNeil v.
Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967); see
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1970); In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109
(1982).
11. The author's inquiry into minors' due process rights in mental health decisions began with the
passage of the Becca Bill by the Washington State Legislature. However, this Comment does not
attempt to address the procedural and substantive due process rights of minors implicated by other
portions of the legislation including: the creation of locked crisis residential facilities for runaway
youth; statutory authority for parents to place their unconsenting minor children in drug and alcohol
treatment facilities; and court proceedings for truancy.
12. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); see infra part I.A.
13. See infra part I.A.
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confinement in mental health institutions. To safeguard these interests,
Washington State's current statutory due process protections 4 must
continue to be applied to minors admitted by their parents when minors
refuse to provide consent for their own inpatient mental health treatment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History ofMinors 'Rights in Treatment Decisions
Traditionally, the judiciary had accorded great deference to parental
authority, with parental duties giving rise to parental powers. 5
Children's rights were viewed as coextensive with the rights of the
parent.'" This deference was based primarily on "children's rights" cases
from early in this century.'7 This trend continued until 1967 when the
U.S. Supreme Court expressly recognized that minors are "persons" who
possess fundamental constitutional rights independent from those of their
parents. 18
Under common law, parental consent traditionally was required before
a doctor could legally treat a minor. This requirement reflected the
assumption that, under normal circumstances, there is an identity of
interests between parent and child. A "mature minor" exception' 9 to the
parental consent requirement exists, however, and it has been upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court0 and lower courts.2' The "mature minor"
14. For an enumeration of these rights, see infra notes 189-199 and accompanying text.
15. See Murray Levine et al., Juvenile and Family Mental Health Law in Sociohistorical Context,
10 Int'l J. L. & Psychiatry 91 (1987).
16. Id.
17. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names ofJesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)
(unconstitutional to prohibit parents from sending child to private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (state may not prohibit parents educating their children in foreign language).
18. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
19. Two other exceptions to this general rule are the emergency exception, when immediate care
is required due to a serious threat to the life and health of the minor, and an exception for
emancipated minors. Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951); Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d
196 (La. 1949); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. 1920).
20. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
21. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990); Baird v.
Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. 1977); Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25 (Ohio 1956); see Kurt
. Pritz, Development of the Doctrine of Mature Minority as a Defense to States' Power of Parens
Patriae, 12 J. Juv. L. 139 (1991).
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exception is recognized in some states by common law, and it has been
codified in several other states.2
The "mature minor" exception is applied when a parent is unfit, or
unable, to provide consent and when there is a recognition that mature
minors are capable of making independent decisions concerning some
types of medical treatment.' Mature minor exceptions either set a low
minimum age of consent for any type of treatmene4 or allow minors to
consent to specific types of medical treatment.' Such policies are
consistent with social science studies that show that the medical
decision-making process employed by minors over the age of thirteen is
generally indistinguishable from the process employed by adults.26 The
Washington Legislature endorsed a mature minor statute when it passed
the Mental Health Care and Treatment for Minors Act,27 which
determined that minors, age thirteen or older, may consent for their own
inpatient, mental health treatment, without obtaining parental approval if
certain requirements are met.
28
22. See Fay A. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide (2d ed. 1990), for a review of
different states' consent laws.
23. Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence To Provide Informed Consentfor Mental Health
Treatment, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 695, 712 (1993).
24. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 7129-81(h) (1995); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§ 10101-10105
(1995).
25. These typically allow for treatment of sexually-transmitted disease, contraception services,
diagnosis of pregnancy, treatment for alcohol and drug abuse, and mental health treatment. Supra
note 22. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the rights of mature minors to obtain abortions
without parental consent, it has also upheld the constitutionality of state statutes that require parent
notification and/or a judicial determination of sufficient maturity before allowing the abortion. Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990);
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
26. See Richard E. Redding, Due Process Protections for Juveniles in Civil Commitment
Proceedings 24 (1991); Lois A. Weithom, Children's Capacity in Legal Comexts, in Children,
Mental Health, and the Law 25 (N. Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984); Char es R. Tremper &
Morgan P. Kelly, Mental Health Rationale for Policies Fostering Minors' Autonomy, 10 Int'l J. L. &
Psychiatry 111, 123 (1987).
27. See supra note 5.
28. Requirements include notice of the minor's admission to the parent. At the parent's request for
release, the minor must be released to the parent unless the Hospital administra:or files a petition
with superior court stating that it is the facility's belief that the minor is in need of inpatient
treatment and release would constitute a threat to the minor's health or safety. Additionally, the
minor's voluntary written consent for inpatient treatment must be renewed every twelve months and
the minor's need for inpatient treatment must be reviewed and documented no less than every 180
days. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.030(2).
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B. Parham v. J.R.
Parham v. JR.29 was the first, and only, U.S. Supreme Court case to
consider minors' due process rights when presented for admission by a
parent to a state-run psychiatric hospital against the minor's will. The
Court held that a Georgia statute authorizing a parent to admit initially a
minor to a state inpatient facility, against the minor's will, and without a
prior judicial commitment hearing, was not per se unconstitutional." The
Court did not determine, however, the full extent to which a mature
minor's federal substantive due process right to refuse forced
hospitalization may be legitimately restricted.
The Parham Court acknowledged that "it is not disputed that a child,
in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment."' The Court recognized
that protectable privacy and liberty interests exist and applied the
traditional Mathews v. Eldridge" test, which guides decisions regarding
state procedures for due process.
After balancing the private interests of both the parent and the minor
pursuant to the Matheivs test, the Court stated, "[T]he child's rights and
the nature of the commitment decision are such that parents cannot
always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to
have a child institutionalized."33 The Court acknowledged that the risk of
error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized for
mental health care was sufficiently great that some kind of inquiry by a
"neutral factfinder" should be made to determine whether statutory
requirements for admission were satisfied. 4 The Court then concluded
that due process was satisfied, at initial admission, if that factfinder was
also the admitting physician at a state hospital.3
A number of questions were left unanswered by the Court. The Court
specifically did not determine "what process might be required if a child
29. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
30. Id. at 616-17.
31. Id. at 600.
32. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Washington courts have adopted the same test for due process
claims regarding involuntary commitment In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 285, 654 P.2d 109, 113
(1982).
33. Parham, 442 U.S. at 604.
34. Id. at 606.
35. Id. at 609.
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contests his confinement by requesting a release."36 Furthermore, the
Court did not specify any requirements for review of the initial
admission decision37 nor did it discuss whether Georgia's state hospitals
had adequate review procedures.38 Additionally, the Court did not
determine what due process protections are necessary when a parent
seeks to admit the minor to a private, rather than public, mental health
hospital. 9 Finally, the Court did not address whether initial admission by
a single parent was constitutional if the other parent, as well as the child,
refused to provide consent for the admission to an inpatieni facility.4"
C. The Becca Bill
The Becca Bill was initiated by an organization of parents who were
frustrated by poor police, social service, and mental aealth service
responses to parents' requests for assistance in controlling their "out-of-
control" children.4 The plight of these parents' groups came to the
forefront of the legislative agenda when the Washington media
extensively covered the murder of thirteen year-old Rebecca Hedman,
who later became the namesake of the "Becca Bill." Many of the news
36. Id. at 617. The Washington Supreme Court answered this question based on statutory grounds
in State ex rel. TB. v. CPC Fairfax Hospital and, therefore, avoided determinring the issue as a
constitutional matter. 129 Wash. 2d 439, 918 P.2d 497 (1996); see infra part I.D.
37. Parham, 442 U.S. at 617.
38. Id.
39. Application of constitutional principles and due process protections are required by private, as
well as public, Hospitals when the admission is governed by a state enabling statute such as title 71,
chapter 34 of the Washington Revised Code. As the Washington Supreme Court aoted, "once a state
has granted a liberty interest by statute... 'due process protections are necessary to insure that the
state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated."' CPC Fairfax, 129 Wash. 2d at 453, 918 P.2d at 504
(quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980)).
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that involuntary commiment represents a
"massive curtailment of liberty" that implicates fundamental constitutional rights, Humphrey v.
Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972), any involuntary, mental health commitment to a private institution
with a nexus to state actors is likely still governed by the state and federal due process clauses,
regardless of whether an enabling statute exists. But see R.J.D. v. The Vaughan Clinic, P.C., 572 So.
2d 1225 (Ala. 1990) (granting partial summary judgment for private psychiatri- Hospital sued by
unemancipated child and her father, finding that, as custodial parent, mother was empowered to
request involuntary admission for her child and admission had not been conducted under color of
state law).
40. See Vaughan Clinic, 572 So. 2d 1225.
41. The Becca Bill was initiated by a number of groups including the Parents Coalition, founded
by King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng. Steven Goldsmith, Can Laws Rein in Kids Who Take
Ofp., Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Feb. 10, 1995, at Al. The Runaway Alliance, a grassroots
organization started by the mother of a runaway, also did extensive lobbying for the passage of the
Becca Bill.
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accounts chronicled Rebecca Hedman's life as a runaway from her
Tacoma, Washington home and her life on the streets as "Misty," a
crack-smoking prostitute whose nude body was discovered in Spokane,
Washington on October 18, 1993. Many subsequent newspaper articles
on "out-of-control" youth referred to Rebecca Hedman's brutal murder.42
Few articles addressed the issues that cause youth to be "out-of-control,"
and only one documented Rebecca Hedman's pre-runaway life of alleged
abuse as an infant, foster-care placement before the age of two, sexual
abuse by an older brother in her adoptive home, and repeated placement
in group homes and drug-abuse treatment programs.43
The combination of the "Becca" stories, extensive media accounts of
children "out-of-control," and parents' impassioned requests for
assistance from the legislature resulted in the Becca Bill amendments to
the Mental Health Care and Treatment for Minors Act (MHCTMA) and
the Family Reconciliation Act,' which provide legal processes for
parents of at-risk youth and children who need state services.45
The Becca Bill 46 amended the voluntary admissions and involuntary
commitment statute for minors, the MIHCTMA.4 7 Most significantly,
these amendments allow minors, ages thirteen and older, to be
"voluntarily" admitted to mental health facilities upon application of a
parent.48 Such admissions differ from the prior statutory scheme that
42. E.g., Steven Goldsmith & Robin Layton, Children of the Shadows, Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Jan. 4, 1996, at Al; Steven Goldsmith & Kurt Smith, Saving Our Kids: Families on the Front Lines,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 11, 1993, spee. rep.; Jolayne Houtz, Putting Brakes on Runaway
Kids, Seattle Times, Jan. 31, 1995, at AI; Marsh Kind, Problems of Juveniles Focus of New Report,
Seattle Times, Sept. 19, 1994, atB3.
43. Kelly McBride, Anger, Pain Drove Girl to Streets: Search for New Life Ends in Murder, The
Spokesman Rev., Nov. 14, 1993, at Al.
44. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 13.32A (1996).
45. The Becca Bill legislative intent states, "The legislature recognizes there is a need for services
and assistance for parents and children who are in conflict. These conflicts are manifested by
children who exhibit various behaviors including: Running away, substance abuse, serious acting out
problems, mental health needs, and other behaviors that endanger themselves or others." 1995 Wash.
Laws ch. 312, § I (codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32.010 (1996)).
46. See supra note 4.
47. Traditionally, evaluation and treatment that a minor consents to have been considered
"voluntary" whereas evaluation and treatment that are not consented to have been considered
"involuntary" which requires "commitment." "Commitment" is statutorily defined as "a
determination by a judge or court commissioner, made after a commitment hearing, that the minor is
in need of inpatient diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment or... less restrictive alternative treatment."
Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.020(3).
48. "A minor may be voluntarily admitted by application of the parent The consent of the minor
is not required for the minor to be evaluated and admitted as appropriate." Wash. Rev. Code
§ 71.34.030(2)(a).
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required minors, thirteen years of age or older, be admitted to a facility
voluntarily by a parent only if the parent's applicatio-a included the
"knowingly and voluntarily" provided written consent of the minor.4"
Prior to the Becca Bill only a county-designated mental health
professional (CDMHP) ° could file a petition with the court for initial
detention of an unconsenting mino: in an inpatient mental health facility.
CDMHPs were required to follow stringent statutory guidelines
regarding admission for evaluation and continued detention for treatment
when the minor failed to provide consent to treatment."'
Language in the "Becca Bill," which stated that parents could
"voluntarily" admit their minor children without the minors' consent, 2
caused a great deal of confusion regarding the effect of the Becca Bill
amendments on minors' due process rights. Many people believed this
amendment meant that a single parents' consent for their :nature minor's
admission vitiated the need for a minor's consent to inpalient evaluation
and treatment.5 3 Extending the reasoning used in Parham far beyond the
limits conceived by the Court, advocates of this position maintained that,
because parents have a legal right to admit their mature minor children to
mental hospitals against their will, parents and the admitting hospitals
have no duty to seek review of the decision to admit, evaluate, provide
treatment, or continue confinement.5 4
Youth rights advocates and civil libertarians were extremely
concerned by this interpretation 5 because, if accurate, the only procedure
available under the statute to guard against the inappropriate confinement
of a "voluntarily admitted" minor is a review by a CDMHP within sixty
49. See supra note 7.
50. "County-designated mental health professionals" are qualified psychiairists, psychologists,
psychiatric nurses, or social workers designated by one or more counties. Wash. Rev. Code
§ 71.34.020.
51. The duties and obligations of CDMIPs who seek admission of unconserting minors was not
changed by the amendments. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 71.34.050-.100. See infra notes 189-199 for a
more thorough discussion of the current commitment scheme.
52. See supra note 48.
53. This was the position maintained by the mental health facility, the minor's parents, and the
judge who first heard the minor's position in State ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hosp., 198 Wash. 2d
439, 918 P.2d 497 (1996). See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
54. CPC Fairfax, 198 Wash. 2d at 441, 918 P.2d at 500.
55. See Amicus Curiae Brief of American Civil Liberties Union & Seattle Displacement Coalition
at 1, CPC Fairfax (No. 63389-4).
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days of admission.56 According to the statutory scheme, if treatment of a
"voluntary" admittee is not appropriate, the CDMHP is required to notify
the facility, the child, the child's parents, and the Department of Social
and Health Services (DSHS). 5 However, the statute fails to indicate
specifically any procedural or substantive due process rights that accrue
with a CDMHP determination that inpatient treatment is not appropriate
when the admission is "voluntary." Additionally, DSHS is required to
select randomly and review the information of children who are initially
admitted to inpatient treatment by their parents. 8 But again, the Becca
Bill does not identify any specific judicial procedures that would insure
minors' release if this systematic review reveals that individual minors
are being held against their will.59
D. State ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hospital
The plaintiff in the Washington Supreme Court case State ex rel. T.B.
v. CPC Fairfax Hospital"0 challenged the view that the Becca Bill's
amendments to the MHCTMA vitiated the need for judicial due process
proceedings when unconsenting minors are admitted by their parents for
inpatient mental health treatment.6' The controversy underlying the case
involved the tension between parents' rights to family autonomy and
minors' rights to constitutionally required judicial due process
proceedings in mental commitment decisions.
At the time of the case, T.B. was a fifteen-year-old girl with a history
of family difficulties.62 In 1994, her mother called the CDMHP to have
T.B. involuntarily committed to a mental hospital; the CDMHP,
however, found T.B. ineligible for commitment because she was neither
a threat to herself or others as a result of a mental disorder.63 T.B.'s
behavior and school performance deteriorated: she ran away from home,
she failed to show up to an at-risk youth court hearing, and she was
56. CDMHPs may, on their own initiative, review the "voluntary" admission of any child between
15 and 30 days after admission. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.025(1). However, the statute requires
DSHS to conduct a review no later than 60 days after admission. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.025(2).
57. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.020(5).
58. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.035.
59. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.025(3).
60. State ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hosp., 129 Wash. 2d 439, 918 P.2d 497 (1996).
61. Id. at 450, 918 P.2d at 503.
62. Id. at 441,918 P.2d at 498.
63. Id. at 442, 918 P.2d at 498.
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arrested and placed in detention.' While in detention, T.B. was seen by a
psychiatrist but T.B. was uncooperative and left after about ten minutes.65
Based on this brief meeting, the psychiatrist determined, "T.B. probably
did not meet the requirements for involuntary commitment but [the
psychiatrist] reported [T.B.] suffered from reactive attachment disorder,
conduct disorder, bipolar II disorder manic type, and attention deficit
disorder. 6 6 T.B.'s parents then approached Fairfax Hc.spital seeking
admission of T.B., and the private mental hospital admitted T.B. in
absentia. Upon release from detention, T.B. was transported to the
hospital by a private ambulance while strapped to a gurney in five-point
restraints.67
T.B. immediately requested release, but Fairfax refused either to
release her or provide for a judicial hearing to authorize her continued
confinement. 68 T.B.'s attorneys filed a writ of habeas corpus and had a
hearing two days after her admission. The trial court determined that
T.B.'s parents had a legal right to place her at Fairfax, and T.B.'s
demand for release did not trigger any duty to seek review by the court.
In addition, the trial court judge determined that the procedures utilized
by T.B's parents and the hospital met the requirements of due process.6 9
The Washington Supreme Court directly accepted T.B.'s appeal from
the denial of her petition for writ of habeas corpus.7" The nine members
of the court were unanimous in the case's result: becau3e T.B. was a
minor who refused to consent to he- inpatient treatment, the hospital was
required to release her within twenty-four hours of her admission or file
an application or petition for initial detention the next judizial day.7' The
court also determined that statutory violations occurred when the minor
was denied immediate access to counsel and subsequent access to her
medical records.72 Because the case could be decided on statutory
64. Id.
65. Id., 918 P.2d at 499.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 444, 918 P.2d at 499-500.
68. Id., 918 P.2d at 500.
69. Id. The trial court's decision, as a sealed opinion, is unavailable.
70. Id. at 441, 918 P.2d at 498. The court of appeals provided the Washington Supreme Court
with certification of the child's appeal.
71. Id. at 451, 918 P.2d at 503. In so holding, the court implicitly indicated its unanimous
rejection of the interpretation set forth by CPC Fairfax and T.B.'s parents %vho argued that the
legislature intended to allow parents' consent for the minor's admission to ultimately vitiate the need
for the minor's consent to treatment.
72. Id.
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grounds, the court did not recognize explicitly the fundamental
constitutional right to due process that was implicated in this case.73
Although unanimous in result, the justices had different analyses of the
facts and legal arguments.74
The majority reached its conclusion based on its interpretation of the
statute's language that characterized T.B. as a "voluntary" admittee, and
as such, they determined she was entitled to be released when she
requested or have a judicial due process hearing to continue confinement
against her will.75 Because she was not released when she requested, her
parents were required to file an application for initial detention the next
judicial day after T.B.'s initial detention.7 6 For involuntary patients,
initial detention always starts at the time of arrival at the facility; as a
"voluntary" patient, however, "start of initial detention" begins at the
time a patient fails to provide consent for treatment or rescinds consent.77
While claiming to avoid the constitutional issues of the case,78 the
majority nonetheless used strident language stating:
Deprivation of these statutory rights in the context of such a
massive curtailment of liberty as commitment to a mental
institution also constitutes a deprivation of that process due under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ....
The concurring minority vociferously challenges the majority's
reading of the statute and argues that the majority exceeded the scope of
its authority by "underhandedly" reaching the constitutional issue.0 The
minority argues that the statutory language referring to an unconsenting
minor's admission as "voluntary," was merely an error due to oversight
by the drafters." Despite calling the majority's reading "Orwellian" and
violative of general statutory principles, the minority nonetheless
emphatically states, "A child admitted against her will cannot be other
73. Id. at 441, 918 P.2d at 498.
74. The majority opinion, penned by Justice Sanders, was signed by Justices Durham, Smith, and
Alexander, with Justice Madsen concurring in the result. The minority concurrence, written by
Justice Dolliver, was signed by Justices Guy, Talmadge, and Johnson. See id at 454-63, 918 P.2d at
505-08 (Dolliver, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 450-51, 918 P.2d at 503.
76. Id. at 451,918 P.2d at 503.
77. Id. at 450, 918 P.2d at 503 (citing statutory definition of "start of initial detention," Wash.
Rev. Code § 71.34.020(23)).
78. See supra note 6.
79. CPC Fairfax, 129 Wash. 2d at 452-53, 918 P.2d at 504.
80. See supra note 6.
81. CPC Fairfax, 129 Wash. 2d. at 459, 912 P.2d at 507.
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than an involuntary admittee .... Unwilling children admitted by their
parents cannot be voluntary admittees."82 The minority's concurrence
states that the statutory provisions governing involuntary admittees must
be applied, and those standards are the same for admitting and detaining
unwilling minors regardless of whether a parent or the state (via a
CDMHP) initiates admission."
In effect, both the majority's and minority's positions clearly posit
that unconsenting minors have a statutory right to judicial due process
when they are admitted by their parents to inpatient mental health
facilities. Furthermore, regardless of the appropriateness of doing so, the
majority's opinion also recognizes that minors have a constitutional right
to due process.
Neither Parham nor State ex rel. TB. v. CPC Fairfax Hospital
explicitly articulate the processes required, by the U.S. and Washington
Constitutions, to safeguard the liberty and privacy interests of minors
who refuse to consent to inpatient mental health treatment at either a
public or private facility. Parham merely maintains that parents initially
may admit their minor children for inpatient evaluation purposes but
goes no further to explain minors' due process rights.84 State ex rel. T.B.
v. CPC Fairfax Hospital states that unconsenting minors in Washington
have a statutory right to due process when being presented for mental
health commitment against their will and the majority highlights the
constitutionally recognized interests of minors facing unwanted inpatient
mental health treatment.
II. CONFINING MATURE MINORS TO MENTAL INSTITUTIONS
AGAINST THEIR WILL WITHOUT JUDICIAL DUE PROCESS
PROCEEDINGS RESULTS IN LIBERTY AND PRIVACY
DEPRIVATIONS THAT VIOLATE THE WASHINGTON AND
U.S. CONSTITUTIONS
Because current case law fails to state explicitly th.t minors who
refuse to consent to inpatient mental health treatment ha-ve fundamental
constitutional rights to judicial due process, parents' rights advocates and
members of the legislature may erroneously believe that minors' due
82. Id.
83. Id. at 461, 912 P.2d at 508.
84. The Court explicitly left open the question of the constitutionality of detaining a minor who
has been admitted by a parent against his or her will once release is requested. Parham v. J.R, 442
U.S. 584, 617 (1979).
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process rights may be further limited by simply amending the
MHCTMA. This Comment explains the processes due when a minor's
constitutionally recognized liberty and privacy interests are threatened by
treatment in an inpatient mental hospital against the minor's will.
Unconsenting minors admitted for inpatient treatment by their parents
have a right to the same due process as all other adults and minors. These
rights and the interests they safeguard must be clearly elucidated."5
A. The Constitutional Right to Due Process When Consent Is Not
Granted for Inpatient Psychiatric Treatment
The U.S. Supreme Court frequently has held that minors, as well as
adults, are entitled to constitutional protections and possess constitutional
rights.86 The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
that, "No state ...shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."87 The Washington Constitution
has been interpreted to provide broader protection for due process rights
than its federal counterpart.88
The Washington Constitution also provides broader protections than
the U.S. Constitution regarding the rights to privacy and freedom from
governmental intrusion into citizens' private affairs. Unlike the U.S.
Constitution, which simply infers the right of privacy from other
constitutional clauses, the Washington State Constitution provides an
explicit right to privacy. 9 This right to privacy has been recognized as a
fundamental right with regard to autonomous decision-making.9"
Particularly in the context of involuntary institutionalization, the
Washington Constitution has been interpreted to provide more expansive
85. See supra note 10.
86. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); supra notes 20,21.
87. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Washington's constitutional language is identical. Wash. Const. art.
I,§3.
88. Wash. Const. art. I, § 3. The Washington Supreme Court identified six nonexclusive factors to
be considered when determining whether the state constitution provides broader protection of
individual rights than the U.S. Constitution. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-63, 720 P.2d
808, 812-13 (1986). For an application of these criteria to juvenile commitment, see Amicus Curiae
Brief of American Civil Liberties Union & Seattle Displacement Coalition at 6-26, State ex rel. T.B.
v. CPC Fairfax Hosp., 129 Wash. 2d 439, 918 P.2d 497 (1996) (No. 63389-4).
89. Wash. ConsL art. I, § 7.
90. O'Hartigan v. Department of Personnel, 118 Wash. 2d 111, 117, 821 P.2d 44, 47 (1991)
(citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)); see Bedford v. Sugarman, 112 Wash. 2d
500, 509, 772 P.2d 486,491 (1989).
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protections of privacy than its federal counterpart and it has been deemed
to protect the right to refuse medical and psychiatric treatment. 91
Additionally, Washington State's courts and legislatures have been ahead
of their federal counterparts in extending more expansive due process
protections to both minors and adults facing forcible hospitalization.92
This has also been true in the case of upholding mature minors' rights to
autonomy in medical decision-making.93
There is no question that both the U.S. and Washingtor. Constitutions
require that due process must accompany involuntary commitment for
mental disorders.94 The U.S. Supreme Court has described forcible
detention in a psychiatric institution as "a massive curtailment of
liberty."95 To commit individuals to mental institutions, the Due Process
Clause requires that the State prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the individuals are both mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or
others.96 Involuntary commitment entails greater deprivations of liberty
than mere confinement and can be imposed indefinitely. Consequently, it
can constitute a more intrusive exercise of state power than
imprisonment for a criminal conviction.97 Forced hospitalization
encroaches on liberty interests by affecting patients' rights of freedom
from unwanted bodily intrusion via physical restraints98 or forced
91. See Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 494
U.S. 210 (1990) (finding that mentally ill inmates have constitutionally recognized privacy-interest
in refusing involuntary medication); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 553 n.1. 747 P.2d 445, 449
(1987) (upholding right of legal guardian for incompetent patient to withhold life sustaining
treatment), amended by 757 P.2d 534 (1988).
92. See Appellant's Brief at 32-33, n.28, State ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hosp., 129 Wash. 2d
439, 918 P.2d 497 (1996) (No. 63389-4). But cf Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash.
1995) (declaring Washington state statute that allowed the involuntary commitment of sexual
predators invalid after it had been upheld by Washington Supreme Court in In re Young, 122 Wash.
2d 1, 857 P.2d 989 (1993)).
93. State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 904, 530 P.2d 260, 263 (1975) (holding mature minors'
tights to autonomy in medical decision-making derives from article 1, section. 3 of Washington
Constitution).
94. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 279, 654 P.2d 109,
110 (1976) (citing In re Levias, 83 Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973); In re Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d
224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973)).
95. In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at 279, 654 P.2d at 110-11 (1982) (citing Hum-hrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
96. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983); Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27; O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975); see also Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 749.
97. Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court., 469 F. Supp. 424,429 (D. Utah 1979) (citing Humphrey,
405 U.S. at 509).
98. In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) the Supreme Court affirmed that "[I]iberty from
bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the due process
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medications," freedom from coercion, and the exercise of autonomy in
medical decisions inherent in the "right to privacy."' The Washington
Supreme Court has held that the full guarantee of due process is
necessary in civil commitment proceedings, and even a guardian ad litem
cannot waive the fundamental due process rights of an incompetent adult
without knowing consent by the accused.'0'
B. Applying the Mathews/Harris Test for Due Process Procedures
The current statutory provisions governing involuntary admittees must
be applied when an unconsenting minor is admitted by his or her parents
to a mental health facility. 2 Both the U.S. and Washington Supreme
Courts use the same balancing test to determine whether due process
requirements have been met when the State's procedures have the
potential to deprive individuals of constitutionally recognized interests.' 3
This test balances the government's interests, the private interests
affected by State action, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of private
interests."° Each of these factors will be considered separately in the
context of Washington State's current procedures for mental health
commitment of minors by their parents.
clause from arbitrary governmental action." Id at 316 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)).
99. Courts have shown great concern for children who are the victims of improper drug use by
institutional authorities. Thus, courts have held that use of behavior controlling drugs violates a
child's constitutional rights. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974); see also Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Pena v. New York State
Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
100. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 122, 660
P.2d 738, 743 (1983); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975). See generally
Marilyn Jackson-Beeck et al., Juvenile Confinement for Psychiatric and Chemical Dependency
Treatment, 10 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 153 (1987).
101. Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 238-39, 517 P.2d 568, 577 (1974) (right to trial by jury
cannot be waived by guardian ad litem without knowing consent of the patient).
102 State ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hosp., 129 Wash. 2d 439, 448-49, 918 P.2d 497, 502, 507
(1996). The statutory provisions include Washington Revised Code sections 71.34.030(3)(d) and
71.34.050(2).
103. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976); In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276,285, 654
P.2d 109, 113 (1982); see supra note 32 and accompanying text. While the U.S. and Washington
Supreme Courts use the same test to balance interests, the weight given to those interests will differ
as the Washington Constitution provides broader protections than its U.S. counterpart. See Amicus
Curiae Brief of American Civil Liberties Union & Seattle Displacement Coalition at 5, CPC Fairfax
(No. 63389-4); supra notes 86-91.
104. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Because in this instance the government's interest is the least
consequential and easily dealt with first, the author has changed the order of analysis.
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1. The Government's Interest
Washington State has an obligation under the MHCTMA to protect
the child's liberty interest and guard against the needless hospitalization
of its youngest and most vulnerable citizens.' Furthermore, due process
clauses of the Washington and U.S. Constitutions require that the nature
of involuntary commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed. 1 6 Thus, even if the State uses fair
procedures, there is still a substantive constitutional obligation, which
cannot be abrogated by statute, to bar arbitrary and wrongful government
actions."7 Such arbitrary government action would include the
involuntarily commitment of minors to mental hospitals as punitive and
rehabilitative measures to address the problems of youth who are
perceived to be "out-of-control," but not mentally ill and dangerous.
The State also has an interest in reinforcing family auto:aomy and the
rights of parents.0 8 The MHCTMA recognizes that parent; have a right
to participate in treatment decisions, and the Becca Bill amendments
created several new mechanisms that assist parents in getting treatment
for their children. 109 Parents now can start the procedure for the
involuntary commitment of an unwilling child, and parents can seek
review if the CDMHP refuses to file the petition for initial detention"' or
105. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.010. The section states:
It is the purpose of this chapter to ensure that minors in need of mental health care and treatment
receive an appropriate continuum of culturally relevant care and treatment, from prevention and
early intervention to involuntary treatment ....
It is also the purpose of this chapter to protect the rights of minors against needless
Hospitalization and deprivations of liberty and to enable treatment decisions to be made in
response to clinical needs and in accordance with sound professional judgm ant. The mental
health care and treatment providers shall encouragethe use of voluntary services and, whenever
clinically appropriate . . . offer less restrictive alternatives to inpatient treatment.
Additionally,... providers shall ensure that minors' parents are given an opportunity to
participate in the treatment decisions for their minor children. The... providers shall, to the
extent possible, offer services that involve minors' parents and family.
§ 71.34.010.
106. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
738 (1972)).
107. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)).
108. Supra note 103.
109. State ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hosp., 129 Wash. 2d 439, 461, 918 P.2d 497, 508 (1996)
(Dolliver, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
110. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.050(1).
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if a hospital refuses to file a petition for fourteen day commitment."' By
intervening immediately after a minor has been initially admitted by a
parent, the State can best achieve its goal of promoting family unity by
interjecting itself between the conflicting parent and child regarding the
commitment decision. Minors and their parents will be assured that the
commitment decision is an objective one and that inpatient treatment is
truly necessary. Judicial oversight of involuntary commitment
proceedings first began in the early part of this century. As a
consequence, judges, lawyers, social workers, and guardians ad litem
who participate in involuntary commitment proceedings are well trained
in handling delicate family and mental health issues. There is no reason
to suspect that when parents make the admission decision, judicial
participants are less likely to conduct their inquiries in a professional
manner that continues to balance respect for family privacy and
autonomy with a minor's right not to be deprived of liberty
unnecessarily. Indeed, by having trained judicial participants in the
admission and treatment decision processes families of mentally-ill
children will have an exposure to a greater number of resources if
outpatient treatment is deemed the most appropriate level of care. When
admission is appropriate, the family can work with trained judicial
participants, not just hospital staff, toward developing appropriate less
restrictive treatment options when inpatient treatment is no longer
appropriate.
The State has an additional interest in protecting its youth from
unethical marketing and abuses of psychiatric diagnoses that might be
inappropriate." 2 The State also has an interest in protecting its own
mental health and legal resources, and those of private and state insurers,
by refusing to allow its adolescents to be "recruited" by companies with
a well-documented history of unethical practices and insurance fraud. In
addition to congressional hearings,"' several lawsuits and costly
investigations have already been undertaken at the federal level. In the
early 1990s National Medical Enterprises, which ran a nationwide chain
of for-profit psychiatric hospitals for children, paid a $379 million
settlement to the federal government over a fraud investigation involving
its psychiatric services.14 Federal government reviews have shown that,
111. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.070(1).
112. See infra part II.B.3.
113. How Inpatient Psychiatric Treatment Bilks the System and Betrays Our Trust: Hearings
Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
114. The settlement has been described as the largest settlement ever with the federal government.
See Elyse Tanouye, Smithcline Is Close to Settling Billing Charges, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1996, at B1.
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because the military offers its members rich medical benefits, private
psychiatric hospital abuses of teenagers and young children from military
families may have cost American taxpayers hundreds of millions of
dollars." 5
The Legislature's intent with the Becca Bill amendments was to assist
parents in procuring mental health treatment for their children, not to cut
financial or administrative costs incurred by the then-existing due
process procedures." 6 Nonetheless, the State's interest in conserving its
judiciary's financial and administrative resources should be addressed.
There should be no increase in judicial costs as a result of requiring
hearings when parents admit their unconsenting minor chi[dren. Prior to
the Becca Bill, all unconsenting minors admitted by C.DMHPs were
entitled to a hearing. Initial admission criterion and standards were not
changed by the Becca Bill, and they are the same regardless of whether
parents or CDMHPs make the admission decisions. If admission criterion
is being applied as required by statute, allowing parents to circumvent
the CDMIP process, and make admissions decisions on their own,
should not in and of itself cause an increase in the number of hearings
required.'
2. Analysis of the Private Interests Affected by the Washington Civil
Commitment Statute for Minors
a. The Minor's Interests
Significant liberty, privacy, equal protection, and due process rights of
minors are affected when minors attempt to make autonomous decisions
about their own medical care and oppose commitment to mental
institutions.
115. See Peter Kerr, U.S. Study ofMental Care Finds Widespread Abuses, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29,
1992, at D1 (stating that federal review of private psychiatric cases, mostly involving children in
military families, has determined that "in 64 percent of the cases patients never should have been
admitted, were kept longer than necessary, or had medical records for which their Hospitals could
notjustify treatment")
116. As evidence, nowhere in the bill did the legislature state that the Becca B 11 was designed to
cure budgetary woes or amend financial obligations by the State.
117. There is the risk that costs will increase if unconsenting minors are being admitted
inappropriately. Any such increase in costs must not be attributed to the processes due after
admission. Instead, they should be attributed to abuses of admitting physicians who have an ethical
and professional responsibility to safeguard minors rights. See infra note 179 wnd accompanying
text.
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Even beneficial commitment involves deprivations that have
accompanying harmful effects that can be manifested in a very short
time."8 Within the hospital, freedom of movement often is closely
regulated." 9 Contact with the world outside the institution is highly
regulated and can be denied by staff for lack of treatment progress or
acting-out behavior. These contacts include visits from friends and
family and trips outside the hospital setting. Upon release, the stigma of
being a former "mental patient" can affect job prospects and
reintegration into the community. These deprivations, if even for a short
time, may have grave and lasting consequences for the rest of the
person's life. 2'
Children may have a stronger liberty interest than adults, as the
consequences of erroneous commitment decisions are more tragic for
children. Children, on average, are committed for longer periods than
adults.' The primary purpose of psychiatric treatment is to alter the
patient's thoughts and behaviors, which has profound implications for
adolescents in the critical stages of identity formation."z Also, the
problem of "institutionalization," whereby patients who have been
subject to the total control of an institutional authority become unable to
"cope" in the community, may be particularly acute for minors due to
long inpatient stays."z Moreover, the use of psychotropic medications
can have a grave impact on an adolescent's physical development.'
118. In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 279, 654 P.2d 109, 111 (1982); see also Redding, supra note
26, at 3-4.
119. Colyarv. Third Judicial Dist. Court., 469 F. Supp. 424,430 (D. Utah 1979).
120. Colyar, 469 F. Supp. at 430; see also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D.
Wis. 1972).
121. Jackson-Beeck et al., supra note 100, at 157.
122. Tremper & Kelly, supra note 26, at 114.
Failure to arrive at any psychosocial self-definition plagues some individuals, particularly those
who find decision-making a threatening and conflict-ridden experience or lack opportunity to
exercise choice. Such failure tends to fuel a sense of isolation, shame, apathy, personal
alienation, and perceptions of being manipulated by others.
Id.
123. Gary B. Melton, Family and Mental Hospitals as Myths: Civil Commitment of Minors, in
Children, Mental Health, and the Law 151, 157 (N. Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984).
124. One court described the potentially disastrous effects of tranquilizing drugs to control
behavior, including "collapse of the cardiovascular system, the closing of the patient's throat with
consequent asphyxiation, a depressant effect on the production of bone marrow, jaundice from an
affected liver, drowsiness, hematological disorders, sore throat, and ocular changes." Nelson v.
Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Peter Breggin & Ginger Ross, The War Against
Children 85-86 (1994) (discussing neurological damage and growth inhibition caused by ritalin,
medication frequently prescribed for children with attention deficit and hyperactivity disorders).
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Finally, the stigma of having been committed to a mental institution can
affect an adolescent's future educational and employment
opportunities.'25
The Washington Legislature recognized the privacy and liberty
interests of minors in creating the MHCTMA. It has been determined
that minors age thirteen or older are mature enough to consent to mental
health treatment and can commit themselves for inpatient treatment
without obtaining parental approval.126
Allowing minors to be committed by a parent against their will can
alienate minors from voluntarily seeking mental health treatment in the
future. If commitment is associated with force and deprivation of
decision-making power, minors who might need less restrictive help,
such as outpatient treatment, are likely to avoid seeking treatment for
fear they will be confined against their will. Similarly, youth who are
confined unnecessarily now are likely to view the mental health system
with fear and distrust in the future. 127
b. Parent's Interest
The U.S. Supreme Court traditionally has permitted broad parental
authority over minor children. It has viewed decisions regarding the
child's best interest as the right of the parents which, absent a compelling
state interest, typically has been protected from state interference.
128
In Parham, the Court presumed that parents "possess what a child
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment" in making
125. "Because of such Hospitalization, they will be prevented from getting state employment,
federal employment, running for public office, alimates [sic] their ability to get future medical
insurance, and labels them with a diagnosis forever." Hearings, supra note 113, a: 156 (statement of
Walter E. Afield, M.D.) (documenting investigation that found thousands of adolescents, children,
and adults have been Hospitalized for treatment they didn't need); see also Parhan v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 626-27 (1979) (Brennan 3., concurring and dissenting in part).
126. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.030(2)(c). Washington also has statutes that allow minors, age
thirteen and above, to obtain medical treatment without parental consent for contriception, sexually-
transmitted diseases, diagnosis of pregnancy, and chemical dependency. See Reproductive Privacy
Act, Wash. Rev. Code ch. 9.02 (1994), Treatment for Alcoholism, Intoxication, ard Drug Addiction,
Wash. Rev. Code ch. 70.96A (1994).
127. See In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 288, 654 P.2d 109, 115 (1982) ("Ms. Harris' only
previous commitment experience was involuntary, and it left her with a lasting fear of commitment
It is not surprising that she became a fugitive when ordered to report to the Hospita.").
128. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; see also Parham v. J.R1, 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (unconstitutional to require Amish children to
attend public high school).
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mental health decisions.'29 Legislative or judicial deference to parental
authority when parents commit their mature minors to inpatient mental
health hospitals is based implicitly on traditional assumptions about
parent/child relationships: parents always act in their child's best
interests and are able to perceive accurately what those interests are;
children are less capable of making life choices than are their parents and
therefore need parental protection; and families are able to care
effectively for their children's needs without outside supports. 3 '
Unfortunately, these assumptions do not always prove correct,
particularly in juvenile commitment cases where parents actively seek
outside support and assistance in decision-making for their children."'
Because parents' concerns must include the well-being of the entire
family, commitment may be based upon these concerns and/or a
misunderstanding of the child's behaviors.' A parent may have
distorted perceptions and may blame all family problems on a child's
behavior, while the child's behavior may be unrelated to mental illness
but, instead, be in response to changes in the family structure, such as
divorce, parental conflict, and family moves which sever social support
networks.'33 Not infrequently, the parent admitting the child for
treatment, suffers from mental illness, or is experiencing extreme crisis
that makes it difficult to cope with parenting responsibilities.'34
The Parham Court's concern that parents would refuse to seek mental
health treatment for their children because of their own privacy
concerns'35 is not resolved by allowing parents to admit their children.
Physicians are required to conduct an investigation and medical inquiry
when making admission diagnoses, so a family's history will need to be
investigated before admission one way or the other.'36
After admission, parent's authority and the right to family autonomy
is significantly diminished. Once parents have decided to surrender
custody of their minor children to a state or private mental institution, the
129. 442 U.S. at 602.
130. See Redding, supra note 26, at 8 (citing Perry & Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial
Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. Fan. L. 633, 635 (1983-84)).
131. Redding, supra note 23, at 699-701.
132. Redding, supra note 26, at 5-6.
133. Id. at 6; see also Lois A. Weithom, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An
Analysis ofSkyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 773, 799-802 (1988).
134. See Melton, supra note 123, at 156-57.
135. Parham, 442 U.S. 584, 613 (1979).
136. See infra notes 190-193 and accompanying text.
1207
Washington Law Review
child is no longer under the exclusive control of the parent. 37 Thus, a
parent's right to autonomy should no longer serve as a barrier to the
minor's right to judicial due process.
3. The Risk ofErroneous Deprivations Is High
Like parents, clinicians frequently misperceive the need for inpatient
psychiatric treatment for minors. 38 Although most cliricians do not
intentionally act contrary to the child's best interests, pressures from
parents, institutions, or diagnostic error may result in inappropriate
treatment recommendations.13 1 Without looking into family history, it is
often difficult for mental health clinicians to make accurate diagnoses
regarding mental illness of minors. t4 Further, other evidence suggests
that clinicians tend to over-diagnose in the case of adolescents in
general.' 4 ' This seems particularly likely at private, for-profit facilities
and when mental health clinicians admit a child who has never
previously undergone any thorough psychiatric evaluation. 42
a. Diagnoses at Admission Might Be Inaccurate
An assessment of an unconsenting minor who has been admitted by a
parent as a result of physical force or coercion seems particularly likely
to produce inaccurate results.'43 Assessing adolescents at admission, in a
stressful and unfamiliar environment, complicates the relatively
unreliable nature of childhood psychiatric diagnosis.'
137. A parent unknowledgable about mental health care may simply defer to a clinician's
diagnosis and treatment program for their child. Weithorn, supra note 133, at 811-12. Despite their
good intentions, in many instances parents are simply unaware that their child is being abused,
medicated, or coerced into inappropriate treatment programs while in inpatient care. Hearings, supra
note 113, at 298 (prepared statement of Louis Smith, J.D.).
138. Melton, supra note 123, at 160-61.
139. Id.
140. Melton, supra note 123, at 161; James W. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental
Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 840, 859-61 (1974); Redding, supra
note 23, at 702-03.
141. Jackson-Beeck et al., supra note 100, at 157; Weithom, supra note 133, al 785-87.
142. See infra parts ll.B.3(a), (b).
143. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
144. See generally Louise Armstrong, And They Call it Help: The Psychiatric Policing of
America's Children (1993); Benedetto Vitiello, M.D., et al., Reliability of DSMd-111 Diagnoses of
Hospitalized Children, 41 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 63 (1990).
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The psychiatric profession's bible, the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V),45 has received strong criticism
for its increasing number of vague and elastic "diagnoses" of "disorders"
that almost exclusively affect children and adolescents. 46 The DSM-1V
identifies many "disorders" that are likely to apply to most juveniles (and
many adults) at some point during adolescence. There are no
recommendations for "treatment" of these "mental disorders," nor are
there guidelines for when inpatient treatment is preferred over outpatient
treatment. Additionally, there are few, if any, words of caution to a
psychiatrist consulting the DSM-IV regarding the interplay of social,
cultural, economic, and familial influences on adolescent behavior.
It is important to understand the DSM-IV adolescent diagnoses to
explain why the involuntary commitment of juveniles, in particular,
should undergo judicial scrutiny as a due process protection of
fundamental liberty interests. According to some reports, about two-
thirds of juvenile inpatients receive initial diagnoses of Conduct Disorder
(CD), a personality or childhood disorder (which includes Oppositional-
Defiant Disorder (ODD)), or transitional disorders. 147
CD is a diagnosis frequently applied to adolescents. The DSM-1V
reports, "The prevalence of Conduct Disorder appears to have increased
over the last decades and may be higher in urban than in rural
settings.... Conduct Disorder is one of the most frequently diagnosed
conditions in outpatient and inpatient mental health facilities for
children.' ' 48 CD is typified by a "repetitive and persistent pattern of
behavior in which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate
societal norms or rules are violated."' 49 Characteristic "symptoms" of CD
include: stealing, lying, property destruction, running away from home,
truancy, and aggression.15 The DSM-IVnotes concerns that the diagnosis
may be misapplied to individuals if the behavior occurs while living in
145. American Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.
1995) [hereinafter DSM-IJ (An 886-page reference book).
146. Stuart A. Kirk & Herb Kutchins, The Selling of DSM: The Rhetoric of Science in Psychiatry
238-44 (1992); Weithom, supra note 133, at 824-26.
147. Weithom, supra note 133, at 788, n.99 (suggesting that only one-third of juveniles admitted
for inpatient treatment suffered from severe or acute mental disorders of the type typically associated
with inpatient admission (such as psychotic, serious depressive, or organic disorders) and citing
California study that revealed that about 53% of Hospitalized juveniles suffered from disorders
defined by antisocial or runaway behavior or general personality problems, whereas those
Hospitalized for depression comprised another 17%)).
148. DSM-IV, supra note 145, at 88.
149. Id. at 85.
150. Id. at 86.
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threatening, impoverished, or high-crime areas.'' The DSM-IV also
reports the risk for CD is increased when a parent has CD, Antisocial
Personality Disorder, alcohol problems, mood disorders, schizophrenia,
or Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADD/ADHD).'52
After CD, the second class of diagnosis frequently assigned to
adolescent inpatients is that of the "personality disorders"' generally and
ODD specifically 53 An essential feature of ODD is a recurrent pattern of
negativistic, defiant, disobedient, and hostile behavior.'54 Negative
behavior is characterized by the child frequently exhibithig least four of
the following eight behaviors: (1) losing temper; (2) arguing with adults;
(3) actively defying or refusing to comply with adult requests; (4)
deliberately annoying people; (5) blaming others for mistakes or
misbehavior; (6) overreacting or becoming easily annoyed by others; (7)
acting angry and resentful; and (8) being spiteful or vindictive.'55
According to the DSM-IV, ODD is more common in families in which
there is serious marital discord or at least one parent has an emotional
disorder (such as maternal depression), learning disability (such as
ADD/ADHD) or a substance abuse problem.'56 An associated feature of
ODD may be "a vicious cycle in which the parent and child bring out the
worst in each other."'5 7 The DSM-IV describes the prevalence of this
"cycle" in families in which child care is given by a succession of
different caregivers or in which harsh, inconsistent, or neglectful child
rearing practices are common." "Manifestations of the disorder are
almost invariably present in the home setting, but may not be evident at
school or in the community."'58 Rates of ODD from two percent to
sixteen percent of the juvenile population have been reported, depending
151. Id. at 88. This seems to indicate that adolescents from poor, urban cities might exhibit all the
symptoms of CD but be "normal" given their social context. However, anotier youth should be
diagnosed as having a "mental disorder" if he or she exhibits the same behavior, has a similar
troubled family environment, but comes from a suburban or rural neighborhood and/or a higher
economic class.
152. Id. at 89; see also id. at 78. ADD/ADHD is another common diagnosis used for adolescents.
The essential feature of ADD/ADHD is a persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-
impulsivity more severe than in others at the same stage of development. Inattention may be
manifested by failing to pay close attention to details, difficulty sustaining iasks, and failure to
follow through on requests or instructions. Id.
153. Weithom, supra note 133, at 790, n.98.
154. Id. at 91.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 93.
157. Id. at92.
158. Id.
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on the "nature of the population sample and methods of
ascertainment."' 9
Identifying the behaviors described above as "mental disorders"
serves to pathologize what is ordinarily seen as fairly common
adolescent behavior. In an adult, the "Oppositional-Defiant" behaviors
would, most likely be viewed as appropriate and healthy responses to
neglect and maltreatment. Yet, these are the diagnoses that were most
often used to admit juveniles to mental health hospitals in the 1980s, 6 '
when the most egregious admissions abuses were common. Indeed,
initial diagnoses of these "disorders" continue to be grounds for
involuntary inpatient admissions today. '61
b. Abuse in Juvenile Admissions by Private Psychiatric Hospitals Is
Cause for Concern of an Erroneous Deprivation
The risk of an erroneous liberty deprivation is more likely to occur
when minors are admitted by their parents to private, for-profit
psychiatric facilities than when admitted by state agents or to state
hospitals. In 1992, the U.S. House of Representatives held hearings
regarding numerous reports of abuse in juvenile civil commitments by
private psychiatric hospitals. 62  The house hearings occurred after
investigations by many individual states. 63 The house and states'
investigations revealed a prevalence of fraudulent billing practices,
159. Id.
160. Armstrong, supra note 144, at 149.
161. In State ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hosp., 129 Wash. 2d 439,442, 918 P.2d 497,499 (1996)
the minor was admitted against her will after a ten minute evaluation, during which she did not
cooperate, that resulted in a diagnosis that included CD among other common disorders. See supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
162. See Hearings, supra note 113; Emerging Trends in Mental Health Care for Adolescents:
Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 5
(1985) (citing data documenting four-fold increase in admissions of adolescents to private
psychiatric Hospitals from 1980-84); Kerr, supra note 115.
163. In the early 1990s, the Texas Senate Interim Committee on Health and Human Services was
particularly thorough in its investigation of private psychiatric Hospitals' abuses due in large part to
media attention to the plight of several adolescents. See Hearings, supra note 113, at 5-6.
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insurance fraud,"6 and intentional misdiagnoses of patients to match
insurance coverage. 6
The House of Representative's hearings resulted in overwhelming
evidence that juveniles were a particular "target" for inpatient mental
health treatment "recruiters" during the 1980S166 when stockholders
began suffering losses or decreases in profits due to empty beds and a
dwindling number of adult patients due to insurance cut-backs.
Companies responded by creating new marketing programs targeted at
adolescents because this group typically has the longest stays, the lowest
costs for care, 67 the highest bills, and the best insurance coverage.
168
The hearings also revealed that companies' marketing departments
specifically targeted concerned parents of "troubled youth" in their
advertising campaigns. Due to highly lucrative insurance benefits for
adolescents, one investigator estimated that in just two hospitals,
hundreds of children with ODD, CD, ADD/ADHD, and adjustment
disorders were admitted for lengthy inpatient stays'69 as, "[t]his group
was the easiest to place in the hospital as the parents made the decision
for admission."' 70
As part of "recruitment" efforts, these facilities offered "evaluations
and services" to school districts, community groups, and crisis-
intervention services.' In fact, one company frequently sent "free"
counselors (recruiters) to the scenes of high-school tragedies to provide
"support" to survivors. ' Hospitals frequently paid "bonuses" to hospital
164. Id. at 44-60 (prepared statement of Louis Parisi, Director, Fraud Div., NJ Dep't of Ins.); id.
at 195-275 (documenting investigations of fraud on behalf of Civilian Health and Medical Program
of the Uniform Services).
165. Id. at 61-77 (statement of Curtis L. Decker, Esq., Exec. Dir., Nat'l Asoec. of Protection &
Advocacy Sys., Inc.) (documenting intentional misdiagnosis, abuse, and neglect in private
psychiatric hospitals); id. at 120-26 (statement of Charles S. Arnold, M.D., Psychiatrist).
166. Id. at 362-521 (documenting marketing practices of psychiatric Hospitals); see also Joe
Sharkey, Bedlam: Greed, Profiteering and Fraud in a Mental Health System Gore Crazy (1994).
167. Cost for adolescent "treatment" is lower than that for adults because treatment for the most
common "adolescent disorders" usually consists of group "therapy" and discussion groups.
Hearings, supra note 113, at 96-107 (statement of Russel D. Durret, former employee, Psychiatric
Hosp.).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 68 (statement of Curtis L. Decker, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Assoc. of Protection & Advocacy
Sys., Inc.).
170. Id. at 105 (emphasis added) (statement of Russel D. Durret, former employee, Psychiatric
Hosp.).
171. Id. at2, 437, 439.
172. Sharkey, supra note 166, at 259.
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staff, including crisis-line counselors and doctors, for referrals that
resulted in admission.173
Once minors were admitted, distressed families were routinely
presented with a very misleading portrayal of services and benefits their
child was receiving." Children's insurance providers would frequently
be billed for several hours of group therapy a day, 75 although most
professionals admit even one-on-one therapy cannot be effective after
about two hours a day. Additionally, children's insurance companies
were being billed daily for dosages and types of medications daily that, if
actually taken, would have been lethal.176 With alarming frequency,
adolescent patients were deemed "cured" the same day their insurance
benefits ran out.'77 As a result of these abuses, many of the discharged
children's behavioral problems were worse, rather than better, after their
inpatient treatment.178
The U.S. Supreme Court in Parham upheld the initial admission of a
minor against his or her will because of the independent medical
decision-making process used by Georgia's state hospitals. This process
included a thorough psychiatric investigation by a "neutral decision-
maker."' 79 Unfortunately, when initial admission is not accompanied by a
previous diagnosis made outside the inpatient mental health facility,
there is a serious danger that such inquiry will not occur.
Washington State's standards for a minor's admission merely require
that a person in charge of an evaluation and treatment facility have a
reason to believe that a minor needs inpatient treatment because of a
mental disorder, that the facility provides the evaluation and treatment
needed by the minor, and that treatment in a less restrictive setting is not
173. Hearings, supra note 113, at 2, 104-05.
174. Id. at 285 (prepared statement of Corydon G. Clark, M.D.).
175. Id. at 102.
176. Id. at 9 (statement of Texas Senator Mike Moncrief, Chair, Tex. Senate Interim Comm. on
Health & Human Servs.).
177. Id. at 285 (prepared statement of Corydon G. Clark, M.D.); Weithom, supra note 133, at
818.
178. There are likely to be differences between state and private hospital admission standards and
private hospitals are more likely to lack neutrality and competency in admission decisions. The State
is likely to have more stringent hiring standards for its hospitals as is consistent with the State's
benevolent purpose of caring for its citizens. Conversely, private mental health institutions are
typically run for profit and admissions staff are likely to have both a professional and financial
incentive to admit minors who don't necessarily meet more stringent state criteria.
179. Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 613 (1979).
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feasible."' 0 However, evidence suggests that minors have been admitted
to inpatient treatment inappropriately because there is a lack of available
or adequate community mental health services... or a lack of insurance
coverage for community based senrices that may exist. 82
c. Admissions Decisions Made Without a Prior Psychiatric
Evaluation Increase the Risk ofErroneous Deprivation
Evidence suggests that a "neutral" decision cannot be made by a
single admitting clinician when a parent brings a child for treatment
without a prior referral from a community mental health professional.'
Although the goal of the psychiatrist is supposed to be the best welfare of
the child-patient, "[i]t is the parent who has come to seek help, whose
situation seems most desperate, who seems the most reliable source of
information about what is wrong, [and] who is closest to the psychiatrist
in age and social outlook ... ." Therefore, the admitting clinician is
more likely to believe or side with a parent when the pare:at and child are
in conflict about the decision to admit. Additionally, concern has been
expressed that there can be no "neutrality" when an admitting clinician
has any relationship with the hospital which could be characterized as a
"financial interest" in the decision to admit. This concern is particularly
compelling in regard to private for-profit hospitals.'85 The intake staff at
private hospitals working with the parents to achieve admission are
usually strongly biased in favor of admission to the hospital and
minimally knowledgeable about alternatives.8 6 Furthermore, there is no
proof that inpatient treatment is any more effective han outpatient
treatment for adolescents with CD and ODD disorders,'87 the most
frequent diagnoses for admission at private hospitals.'
180. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.030(2). The Becca Bill amendments did not alter this portion of
the statute.
181. See Redding, supra note 26, at 6-7; Weithom, supra note 133.
182. Weithorn, supra note 133, at 814-15, 828-29.
183. Redding, supra note 23, at 702 (citing Ellis, supra note 140, at 868).
184. Id.
185. Weithom, supra note 133, at 816-21.
186. Hearings, supra note 113, at 285 (statement of Corydon G. Clark, M.D.).
187. Melton, supra note 123, at 159.
188. See supra note 147.
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C. Current State Procedures Adequately Recognize Parents'Interests
and Safeguard Minors'Rights
Due process requires that admission decisions be based on sound
clinical judgment, family history, a serious mental health need that can't
be met in a less restrictive environment, and the threat of danger to
oneself or others. To ensure that this criterion is met in the case of
minors, judicial review of admission decisions and continued treatment
are required by both the Washington State and Federal Constitutions.
The current statutory scheme of the MHCTMA, as recognized by the
Court in State ex rel. TB. v. CPC Fairfax Hospital, safeguards minors'
due process rights while simultaneously allowing parents a role in the
mental health decisions of their children. These protections begin with a
petition for initial detention the next judicial day after admission. The
procedures for this petition trigger a number of due process
protections. 9 First a determination must be made that the minor, "as a
result of a mental disorder 9 ' presents a likelihood of serious harm'9' or is
gravely disabled."' 92 When investigating whether or not the minor meets
these defined standards, one must look into the specific facts alleged, the
credibility of the person or persons providing the information, and the
determination that voluntary admission for inpatient treatment is not
possible.93
If these requirements are met, one can petition for an "involuntary"
seventy-two hour treatment period to approve an initial detention at a
treatment facility providing inpatient assessment and treatment.'94 The
minor must be given a copy of the petition, notice of initial detention,
189. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.050.
190. "Mental disorder" pertains to organic, mental, or emotional impairment that has substantial
adverse effects. "The presence of alcohol abuse, drug abuse, juvenile criminal history, antisocial
behavior, or mental retardation alone is insufficient to justify a finding of 'mental disorder."'
§ 71.34.020(12).
191. "Likelihood of serious harm" means either (a) a substantial risk that the individual will harm
him or herself as evidenced by threats or attempts of suicide or physical harm; (b) a substantial risk
that that the individual will harm someone else, as evidenced by prior harms to others or a reasonable
fear of harm by another;, or (c) a substantial risk that an individual will harm other's property, as
evidenced by prior behavior causing substantial property loss or damage. § 71.34.020(11).
192. "Gravely disabled minor" means a minor with a mental disorder who is in danger of serious
physical harm due to a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or safety, or
who, as a result of not receiving essential care for health and safety, manifests severe deterioration in
functioning and repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions.
§ 71.34.020(8) (1996).
193. § 71.34.050(1) (1996).
194. § 71.34.050 (1996).
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and a statement of his or her rights.' The petition must be filed with the
court on the next judicial day following initial detention and serve the
petition and notice on the minor's attorney as soon as possible.
196
Additionally, the minor must be informed, orally and in writing, that a
probable cause commitment hearing will be held. within seventy-hours;
that the minor has a right to communicate with an attorney; and that the
minor has the right to have an attorney appointed if the minor is
indigent.' 97 Finally, the evaluation facility must evaluate the minor's
condition within twenty-four hours and decide whether to admit or
release the minor in accordance with the involuntary commitment
procedures. 98 After the initial seventy-two hour treatment period, a
professional person in charge of the evaluation and treatment facility
must again file a petition with the county superior court to have the
minor committed for an additional fourteen days For diagnosis,
evaluation, and treatment.'99
Any amendment of the current statutory scheme that would allow
distraught parents and staff at private, for-profit, mental health facilities
to detain minors who are not mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or
others will certainly violate minors substantive due process rights.
Similarly, any amendments that would allow for less stringent admission
and detention standards, or do away with the right to judicial review of
the detention and treatment decisions, will violate mirors' rights to
procedural due process.
III. CONCLUSION
Mature minors who have been admitted to mental health facilities
against their will, and without their consent, are entitled to due process
protections, regardless of whether parents or state agents are making
admissions decisions. U.S. Supreme Court cases make clear that, when
constitutionally protected interests are at stake, fundamental due process
requires the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time i a meaningful
manner."' Whenever prior hearings are impracticable,"' states must
195. § 71.34.050(2) (1996).
196. § 71.34.050(2).
197. § 71.34.050(3) (1996).
198. § 71.34.050(4) (1996).
199. § 71.34.070 (1996).
200. Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 633 (1979) (Brennan, 3., concurring and dissenting); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing in part Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965)).
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provide prompt post-deprivation hearings. 2 Given the significant liberty
and privacy deprivations implicit when inpatient mental health treatment
is against a person's will, minors' rights must be protected against
erroneous commitment decisions made only by well-intentioned, but ill-
informed, parents and admitting clinicians at private, for-profit facilities.
Due process requires judicial review of admissions decisions and
continued treatment as provided for under Washington's current statutory
scheme in the MHCTMA. The current scheme safeguards minors' due
process rights while simultaneously allowing parents a role in the mental
health decisions of their children. Washington State's minors are
guaranteed these specific due process procedures, not only because they
are codified in the MHCTMA, but also because they are constitutionally
required by both the Washington and U.S. Constitutions to protect
against the very real threat of erroneous deprivations of liberty and
privacy interests.
201. The Parham court determined that judicial hearings prior to admission were impracticable.
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. However, after admission, parents interests cease to
outweigh minors' rights to a post-deprivation hearing. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
202. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991); Parham, 442 U.S. at 634 (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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